On the Problem We Have Created

With regard to the matter of the movements of Gaius Julius Caesar, it seems plain that little real action has been taken so far. In truth, we have asked him to return, but we have also given him no alternative orders or incentives. Should we choose to send a friendly emissary in the form a sympathetic senator, we will accomplish little more than was accomplished with our first messengers, which is to say, nothing. In order to accomplish our goals, we must accept the fact that we must entice the young commander with some sort of incentive, or at least another objective.

Naturally, this idea brings up for consideration the question of what sort of objective should be offered. It can be argued that we should send the considerable forces under Gaius Julius Caesar to make a stand against Marcus Aemilius directly. Between the combined legions of Caesar and Dolabella, it is reasonable to think that we could end the threat of Lepidus once and for all. However, we must also recognize the possibility that the close proximity between the legions of Caesar and Lepidus will encourage them to unite against a common enemy. At the same time, to ask him to return to Rome merely to position his troops around the city, even if such a request should be worded in the most flattering and diplomatic language, will seem like nothing more than a patronizing offer from a haughty and superior body.

Despite these problems, I am uncomfortable with leaving Caesar to his whims in Parthia, though not for the reasons I have previously heard stated. I do not fear leaving Caesar in the East because of the possibility he might raise funding for himself in the same manner that his father did in Gaul. Should our plans fail, resulting in Dolabella’s defeat against Lepidus, we would very dearly wish for the aid of those legions under Caesar, but to no avail. Even if we assume that we have misjudged his motivations, and that he truly wishes to aid and obey Rome, he will be much too far away to render any sort of help. Moreover, this entire idea assumes that, by the time we have finished dealing with Lepidus, Caesar will not have met a fate similar to that of Marcus Licinius Crassus and his son at the hands of the Parthian hordes.

Whether or not you trust Gaius Julius Caesar’s actions up to this point, we have no option other than to tread carefully, lest we provoke further action by Caesar or, gods forbid, a concerted strike by Caesar and Lepidus. To this end, I admit that we have no hope of removing Caesar from his command at this time, but I remain insistent upon the fact that, if we have any hope of using him to our advantage, we must provide him with an incentive. This incentive may be nothing more than instructions to move his legions into a position that is more strategically beneficial to Rome than Parthia, but an offering of some kind must be made. Some of you may balk at this idea, as you may see it as conceding to the wishes of a youth who walks on the very borderline of treason, but at this point we have little choice. We dare not directly antagonize him, and if we offer only empty words and promises, our pleas will surely only fall on deaf ears. It is a fine line we now must walk, yet we can only blame ourselves for the necessity of it. Thus, if we must swallow our Roman pride for a short while in order to preserve the sanctity of the state as a whole, we must accept this fact as the consequence of our prior actions.